ABSTRACT. Two extensions of the Shapley value are given. First we consider a probabilistic framework in which certain consistent allocation rules such as the Shapley value are characterized. The second generalization of the Shapley value is an extension to the structure of posets by means of a recursive form. In the latter setting, the Shapley value for quasi-concave games is shown to be a core-allocation.
INTRODUCTION
Consider the problem of allocating some overall costs among a number of agents who have undertaken a joint venture. This allocation problem may be solved in a variety of ways, but an allocation rule that prescribes somehow a solution for the allocation problem should be justifiable on the basis of generally accepted principles. A well-known solution of cooperative games is the Shapley value (cf. Shapley [1953] , Roth [1988] ).
A cooperative game is described by a pair .N; c/, where N is a finite set of n ≥ 2 players and c : 2 N → R is a cost function satisfying c.∅/ = 0.
As mentioned above, a central problem in cooperative game theory is to find a 'fair' allocation of the total costs c.N / to the players. A vector x ∈ R N is a cost allocation if x is efficient, i.e. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the characterization of the Shapley value by Evans [1996] is generalized. Evans [1996] has proposed a specifically chosen probabilistic framework based on a certain "uniform" probability distribution. In this framework, the Shapley value has been characterized as the unique consistent allocation, where consistency refers to a particular property described in this section. We generalize Evans' result in that the existence and uniqueness of the consistent solution is established within a similar, but less restrictive probabilistic framework. Furthermore, we consider the case in which the set of players is (partially) ordered. However, it turns out that only subfamilies L . P/ that contain also the complement of permitted coalitions can be considered. Hence the results do not hold for subfamilies L . P/ such as (1.2) and (1.3). Therefore, in Section 3, we propose another generalization of the Shapley value by an extension of the recursive formula for the Shapley value introduced by Sprumont [1990] . We show that this generalized Shapley value is a core-allocation for quasi-concave games.
THE UNIFIED PROBABILISTIC MODEL AND CONSISTENT ALLOCATIONS
The solution approach taken here is that the solution of the game is to be determined endogenously as the expected outcome of a probabilistic reduction of the cooperative n-person game to various induced two-person games. For that purpose the player set N is to be partitioned into two complementary coalitions S and N\S, and from each of these two coalitions a leader ("representative") has to be chosen to cope with the bilateral division problem how to divide the total costs c.N /, taking into account the costs c.S/ and c.N\S/ of the two coalitions involved. It is supposed that any bilateral division problem is solved by applying the so-called standard solution in that the surplus c.N / − c.S/ − c.N\S/ is charged equally to both leaders of the two coalitions, in addition to their initial costs. That is, the leader of coalition S is charged the amount of c.S/ + and subsequently, this leader i is obliged to charge all other agents j, j ∈ S\{i}, of his coalition the amount x j in accordance with the prespecified cost vector x ∈ R N , and the remaining costs are allocated to the leader himself.
Since the model supposes that players split randomly into two coalitions, each with a randomly chosen leader, let p.S; N\S/ ≥ 0 denote the probability of the formation of the ordered partition .S; N\S/ and p S i ≥ 0 the probability that player i will be leader of coalition S, where S N, S = ∅, and i ∈ S. In this probabilistic framework, the expected cost allocation to player i in the cooperative game .N; c/ with reference to the cost vector x is determined by the next expression:
The factor 2 arises in (2.1) because it is supposed that the ordered partitions .S; N\S/ and .N\S; S/ being equally likely, that is p.S; N\S/ = p.N\S; S/ for all S N, S = ∅. Since the probabilistic model involves a probability distribution { p.S; N\S/ | S N; S = ∅} over the finite set of ordered partitions of the player set and various probability distributions {. p S i / i∈S }, S N, S = ∅, concerning leaders within coalitions as well, we make use of the following two assumptions: ( Under one additional assumption on the relevant probability distributions, the next theorem states the existence and uniqueness of a consistent allocation. Further, an explicit formula for the consistent allocation is presented. The additional assumption takes into account the probability that a fixed player will be leader of coalitions containing another variable player and requires that these probabilities are the same for all variable players. Let .N; c/ be a cooperative game, i ∈ N and x ∈ R N a cost allocation for the game .N; c/. By some careful, but straightforward combinatorial computations concerning some double sum, we arrive at the following chain of equalities:
Hence the consistency constraint (2.2) for the allocation x reduces to the following equality:
In order to deduce (2.3) from the latter equality, it remains to establish that p i −p i = 1 2.n−1/ for all i ∈ N. Actually, we claim that the following results hold:
(2.5)
To prove the first statement in (2.5), some straightforward combinatorial computations concerning some double sum and applying the assumptions (P2) and (P1) 
To prove the second statement in (2.5), a similar reasoning, for all i ∈ N, yields the following chain of equalities: 
From the obtained equalities j∈N p j = 1 and
That is, (2.5) holds which completes the full proof of the theorem. ♦
The following corollary presents the result by Evans [1996] . The straightforward proof is left to the reader. (2.3) reduces to
which is equivalent to (1.1) .
In the rest of this section, we suppose that (P1), (P2) and (P3) hold. Define the consistent allocation rule as the rule that assigns to every cooperative game .N; c/ its unique consistent allocation as given by (2.3). We say the consistent allocation rule possesses the dummy player property if for every cooperative game .N; c/, the consistent allocation x ∈ R N satisfies x i = c.{i}/ for every dummy player i in the game .N; c/.
The next theorem presents two characterizations of the dummy player property to hold true for the consistent allocation rule. A first characterization refers to necessary and sufficient conditions on the underlying probability distributions stating that the probability of a player's leadership within a nontrivial coalition (with reference to the corresponding ordered partition of the player set) is the same for both the coalition and its complementary coalition enlarged with the given player. The second characterization requires the consistent allocation rule to be a probabilistic marginalistic allocation rule (cf. Weber [1988] ) in that the allocation to any player is some expected outcome of his marginal contributions in the game. Note that the Shapley value is an example of a consistent allocation rule that satisfies the dummy player property. 3) . The dummy player property of the consistent allocation rule yields x i =c.{i}/ = 0. However, by (2.3), x i can be determined as follows by distinguishing two cases:
From this, together with x i = 0, we conclude that (D1) implies (D2).
(b) (D2) implies (D3).
Suppose (D2) holds. Then for all i ∈ N the following chain of equalities holds. Using this partial result, we deduce by straightforward calculations that, for all i ∈ N the consistent allocation x i as given by (2.3) reduces as follows: This completes the proof of (b).
(c) (D3) implies (D1).
This implication is trivial by the definition of a dummy player and the assumption on the collection {q S i | S ⊆ N; S i} for any player i ∈ N. ♦ Up to now, we have only treated the case in which the set of players was unordered.
Let L . P/ be a subfamily of permitted coalitions depending on a poset P = .N; /.
Within our probabilistic framework, this can be modelled by making the probability p.S; N\S/ equal to zero whenever S or N\S = ∈ L . P/. It is clear that we have to make the following assumption:
As an extra condition one could decide that only a player i ∈ S for which there does not exist a player j ∈ S with j i can be leader of S. This can be modelled by making the probability p S j equal to zero for all players j ∈ S for which there exists a player k ∈ S with j ≺ k. If the (adjusted) probability distributions { p.S; N\S/ | S N; S = ∅} and {. p S i / i∈S }, S N, S = ∅ satisfy the conditions (P1), (P2) and (P3), the results presented in this section stay valid.
However, subfamilies L . P/ such as (1.2) and (1.3) do not satisfy (C). Therefore, in the next section, we propose another approach that also yields a generalized Shapley value.
THE RECURSIVE SHAPLEY VALUE
In this section, the recursive formula for the Shapley value presented by Sprumont [1990] is treated. This formula has only been defined for cooperative games . P; c/ where L . P/ = 2 N . We give a generalization of this formula that holds for a larger class of subfamilies L . P/. where for all T ∈ L . P/; S ∈ L .T /; S = ∅, the coefficients .T; S/ are recursively given by
Consider a coalition
.T\ j; S/ otherwise.
(3.4)
Before proving that r is an allocation rule, we first show that r is a generalization of the Shapley value.
suffices to show that
By assumption (A), we can use induction on |T|.
If |T| = 1 then .T; T / = 1. Suppose |T| > 1. We have, by definition, Proof: First we will prove that the recursive form holds. This will be done by some combinatorial computations concerning some double sum.
Suppose T ∈ L . P/ and i ∈ T. There are two cases. 
We have ♦ As mentioned in the introduction, a cost allocation should be "fair" in some sense. A possible way to define fair allocations is to demand that they are in the core of a cooperative game. The idea of the core of a game essentially goes back to von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944] . core(N; c) is the set of all allocations x ∈ R N for which there is no coalition S ⊆ N such that x.S/ > c.S/, which means that no coalition should have to pay more than its cost. It turns out that the Shapley value lies not in the core for a general cooperative game. However, for the class of the so-called quasi-convex games, Sprumont [1990] proved that the Shapley value belongs to the core. We make one extra assumption to hold for a subfamily L . P/. It is straightforward to see that, besides L . P/ = 2 N , (1.2) and (1.3) also satisfy this assumption.
(B) S ∩ T * ⊆ S * for all T ∈ L . P/; S ∈ L .T /.
A cooperative game . P; c/ is called quasi-concave if Clearly, this definition corresponds with the original definition of quasi-convexity as given by Sprumont [1990] if L . P/ = 2 N . Note that, because of assumption (B), S\i ∈ L . P/ for all T ∈ L . P/; S ∈ L .T / and i ∈ S ∩ T * .
In the following theorem, we generalize the result of Sprumont [1990] for subfamilies L . P/ not necessarily equal to 2 N . The recursive formula of r turns out to be very useful in the proof. 
Theorem 3.2. Let L . P/ be a subfamily that satisfies assumption (A) and (B). If the cooperative game (P; c) is quasi-concave, then r . P; c/ ∈ core(P; c).

Proof
